Does distributed presence create distributed liability? Does participation in a blockchain based decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) subject you to worldwide liability? While a one-sized fits all rule isnât possible, it may help to understand what jurisdiction means and how Courts acquire it.[1]
(If youâre trying to understand why this even matters, youâll find this authorâs views on the subject in an earlier post titled âHow to Sue a DAOâ).
Jurisdiction refers to a Courtâs authority to apply laws to disputes between parties and to do so in a way that can be enforced. (My old legal dictionary is even pithier: itâs âthe power to hear and determine a caseâ).[2]
Legal liability (distributed or not) can only be established by a Court that has jurisdiction. Enforceable legal liability presupposes jurisdiction.
In the US, the Constitution and a variety of statutes define the scope of Courtâs jurisdiction and describe the kinds of disputes that they can adjudicate. (Iâm a U.S. lawyer, so I do draw on U.S. legal principles, though I imagine that jurisdiction is a threshold requirement in most places).
What do Courts do? As Justice Marshall famously (to lawyers, anyway) and carefully put it in Marbury v. Madison:
âIt is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.â
In short, US Courts interpret, expound, and apply laws. They rely upon the Executive Branch to carry out and enforce their judgments. (For example, US Marshals work for the Department of Justice, which is within the Executive Branch).
Next, some basic jurisdiction concepts and terms.
The threshold jurisdictional requirement I discussed above is sometimes called âsubject matter jurisdiction.â
For example, âdiversity jurisdictionâ is one type of subject matter jurisdiction US Federal Courts exercise. It allows a Court to decide certain kinds of disputes between parties where the plaintiffs and defendants are not citizens or residents of the same state and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000, exclusive of fees, costs and interest. Thereâs more to it, of course, and it can also apply to non-US parties. (See 28 U.S.C 1332. This is just one example, and there are many other kinds of Federal Court subject matter jurisdiction).[3]
Similarly, if you want to sue someone in small claims court in Washington, DC, the amount in controversy has to be less than $5,000. The court doesnât have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes in excess of $5,000.
Nutshell: courts have to have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve disputes or find someone liable. While it may be true in practice that anyone can sue anyone for anything, or try to do so, Courts donât have unlimited subject matter jurisdiction, at least not U.S. Courts.
So if youâre in DAO and youâre wondering about liability and U.S. Courtsâ jurisdiction, the first thing you have to figure out is how, if or why a Court would have subject matter jurisdiction.
Neither parties nor courts can manufacture subject matter jurisdiction. Hereâs what happened in a civil case that I once handled:
And hereâs a recent example from a criminal case. In United States v. Levin, a warrant issued by a magistrate court judge was deemed void ab initio by the district court, rendering evidence seized with the warrant in admissible. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52907 (D. Ma 2016). The Court observed that âthe NIT Warrant made clear that the NIT would be used to âobtain[] informationâ from various âactivating computers.ââ
As is clear from Levinâs case â his computer was located in Massachusetts â at least some of the activating computers were located outside of the Eastern District of Virginia. That the Website A server is located in the Eastern District of Virginia is, for purposes of Rule 41(b)(1), immaterial, since it is not the server itself from which the relevant information was sought.â
I may have made you feel a little bit better, but please donât get too comfortable: Iâve only noted two cases. And while subject matter jurisdiction isnât unlimited, Courts in the US exercise broad jurisdiction over many, many things, and through the Hague Convention and extradition treaties can reach outside of territorial boundaries to enforce US laws over matters they deem to be within their subject matter jurisdiction. To that end, someone running an illegal Ponzi scheme in Country Z that is directed to US citizens and causes harm in the US, may still be deemed subject to a US Courtâs subject matter jurisdiction. (This is not a normative evaluation or judgment, by the way, itâs simply the lay of the land).
To illustrate this scope, hereâs how a âIâm outside of the USâ argument was recently rejected by a federal court in the Southern District of New York:
âBudovskyâs nexus argument is meritless. Assuming that the Government is required to state the nexus of the alleged crimes to the United States in an indictment, the Indictment includes several allegations that establish a sufficient nexus with the United States. The Indictment alleges, among other things, that Liberty Reserve had over 200,000 users in the United States; the siteâs users included criminal rings operating in the United States; Budovsky moved $13.5 million from a Costa Rican bank account held by Liberty Reserve through a correspondent bank account in the Southern District of New York; and Budovsky engaged in money laundering with the object of transferring funds in and out of the United States.
Budovsky argues that his conduct and Liberty Reserveâs operations occurred wholly outside the United States, that Liberty Reserve targeted a global market rather than the United States, and that the Indictmentâs claim that Liberty Reserve had 200,000 users in the United States could âonly be supposition.â Since in a motion to dismiss an indictment the facts alleged by the Government are taken as true, Budovskyâs evidentiary arguments do not require dismissal.
Budovsky further argues that even if the existence of a large user base in the United States constitutes a sufficient nexus, âany operator of any web business â located anywhere in the world â could be hauled into United States courts.â While the advent of the web may create a theoretical concern about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. criminal laws, in this case the Indictment has sufficiently alleged the conduct of a criminal business with the aim of causing harm to US citizens and U.S. interests. See Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118; see also United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding venue in a child pornography case based on viewing of defendantâs Internet advertisement in the forum state).â
See United States v. Budovsky, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717 (D. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Takeaways: Subject matter jurisdiction isnât unlimited. At the same time, itâs broader than many understand. How can you protect yourself against unwitting distributed liability? Understand your use case, identify jurisdictional nexuses, and donât assume that because youâre in Country X that Country Y canât touch you. If particular jurisdictions are a concern, can you make a good faith effort to try to block them, understanding that there may be ways around any wall.
(Also, Iâm not suggesting that anyone break laws or look for safe havens to do so, but extradition treaties and international judgment enforcement of course have some limitations. If Country X doesnât accept that conduct that Country Y deems a crime is in fact a crime, this may impact its court systemâs willingness to cooperate. Thus, an attempt to exercise jurisdiction extra-territorially can be dependent and limited by cooperation by other sovereigns).
In addition to authority to decide a dispute between people, US courts need to have jurisdiction over the people themselves. By people, I include ânatural personsâ and corporate entities. This is known as personal jurisdiction or (if you like Latin) in personam jurisdiction.
Physical presence is the easiest way to get personal jurisdiction. If you are a citizen or resident of state A or happen to be in A state when a process server hands you a Summons and Complaint, your presence may be enough to give the Court in that state personal jurisdiction over you. Corporate entities may designate representatives who can be served for the entity, and rules or statutes may identify people who can be served on their behalf. Just because you own stock in a corporation, or are employed by it doesnât necessarily mean your presence in a particular state gives the state jurisdiction over the corporation.
How about personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association? Itâs tricky, at best. For a flavor of this, if youâre a hockey fan, take a look at Donatelli v. NHL,893 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989), in which the Court held that âan unincorporated association which does not itself conduct significant activities in, or enjoy affiliating circumstances with, a state cannot be subject to the general personal jurisdiction of the stateâs courts on the basis of a memberâs contacts within the state unless the member carries on the in-forum activities under the associationâs substantial influence. Because such control is absent here â there is no âplusâ factor beyond the Bruinsâ mere membership in the association â the district courtâs assertion of jurisdiction over the NHL was not constitutionally permissible. Reversed.â
Parties can also consent to personal jurisdiction (which youâll often see in a boilerplate contract). Parties may also waive objections to personal jurisdiction, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction, which canât be waived. (See, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)).
Most states (it may be all, but I havenât done a survey recently) have laws that govern a courtâs exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. These are called âlong arm statutesâ. Entering into a contract in a state, contracting to insure a risk in a state, or committing a tort in a state are some common examples of things that will subject someone to personal jurisdiction in another state, under a long-arm statute.[4]
F.R.C.P 4(e) tells US federal courts that they are to follow the law of the state in which the court is located, though this is subject to constitutional limitations.
Ask a US lawyer about personal jurisdiction and even a transactional lawyer who hasnât thought about civil procedure for 25 years will probably mumble something about the International Shoe case and the requirement that someone âpurposefully availâ themselves of the benefits of doing business in a particular jurisdiction.
Over-generalizing, a bit: a random, incidental, episodic connection to a state may not be enough. Parties fight about this all the time, though, and itâs up to a court to determine whether contact by someone from outside of the state would be sufficient to trigger long-arm jurisdiction. (The Supreme Court revisited personal jurisdiction in a 9-0 decision handed down in 2014 in Daimler AG v. Bauman et al.)
The takeaway: even if you are not physically present you can be subject to a courtâs personal jurisdiction. But you have to have some contact. How much? What kind? It depends. Weâll talk about this a bit more in a second.
Can you sue a thing? Well, yeah, you kind of can.
If you canât locate or serve a person, a court may still be able to exercise âin remâ jurisdiction, or power/authority over a thing. When looking for an example, I came across a reference to a case that I wish we had studied in law school: United States v. One Tyrannosaurus Bataar Skeleton (SDNY 1:13âcvâ00857).
In rem jurisdiction can be used to seize property, transfer ownership, and do so when the owner canât be haled into court for some reason but the property is physically within the Courtâs jurisdiction.[2] (See also, http://www.usmarshals.gov/assets/2015/dpr-february-auction/sale-order.pdf; http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us-government-auction-10m-worth-bitcoins-silk-road-seizure-1522672).
Iâve mostly referred to US Federal Courts. As a federal system, the US also has state courts, and states are treated as âco-equal sovereignsâ. Thereâs a complicated collection of law that deals with this interaction. You can do something that is isnât a problem under federal law but is a problem under state law. You can also sometimes be liable under both.
Lotâs of nuance here, but the nutshell is this: more than one court can have jurisdiction over the same thing (blue sky is one example).
Iâm going to conclude with a return to personal jurisdiction over foreign defedants for a second, as this is very much on point for distributed ledgers and DAOs.
How do concepts like presence or âpurposeful availmentâ work for a distributed organization or project or platform that relies upon a distributed ledger? Are they relevant? What does presence mean? Physical? Virtual?
The good news (yes, thereâs good news) is that this isnât entirely uncharted territory. Everything old is new again. Back when the Internet was still a new(ish) thing to most people, courts had to grapple with defendants who were located outside of their states operating websites that could be viewed within their states. Courts applied existing legal principles to the technology, relying on International Shoe, Burger King v. Radiewicz and other precedent. They still do. (See and compare , Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) and ITI Holdings, Inc. v. Profâl Scuba Assân, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3747; and see Sebastian Brown Prods., LLC v. Muzooka Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40132 (D. Del. 2015)).
With or without legislative guidance, blockchain jurisdiction cases will do the same thing, whether a DAO is involved or not. Itâs how the Common Law works; life of the law = experience != logic, paraphrasing Holmes.
Still, itâs tempting to head down a rabbit hole here and attempt to provide a simple answer, or to go the opposite direction and not try at all and hope for the best. Neither is a good approach. Itâs more helpful to consider specific use cases and identify jurisdictions that might be implicated or interested.
It may also matter whether civil or criminal laws are at issue. If youâre doing something clearly illegal in country X and are doing so in concert with people in Country X, or are directing communication to, with or into Country X, the fact that you are in country Y or the fact that itâs blockchain donât seem like a terribly good jurisdictional defense to me. For a DAO, one might consider the forums where a dispute might arise and the form that the DAO takes. One might also consider whether an unincorporated association would be treated differently than a corporation, and if the latter is a structure for which presence and jurisdiction are easier to predict.
Iâm not taking an absolute position on these things because I firmly believe that you need specific facts to determine outcomes. Anything else is advice or guidance in a vacuum.
That caveat in mind, I wouldnât agree that âdistributed presenceâ always equals âdistributed liabilityâ any more than I would agree that it never equals âdistributed liabilityâ. It depends on who you are, what youâre distributing, what sort of presence you have, and where you have it.
Justice Holmes would be right at home.
Footnotes:
[1]. These are my opinions only, are not legal advice, and are neither shared nor sanctioned by past, present or future clients or any firm with which Iâm associated. Also, while Iâm aware that several DAOs have been in the news lately, my observations are generic, and not directed at any particular organization. The âHow to Sue a DAOâ piece has been misunderstood by many. Anyone who thinks itâs a roadmap for a lawsuit is encouraged to re-read the piece, footnotes 3 and 4 in particular. Nor does it say that all DAOs are general partnerships or associations. It points out some general legal principles that *might* apply.
[2]. Barronâs Law Dictionary (3d Ed., 1991).
[3]. Iâm steering clear of distinctions between equity/law and other important but nuanced concepts like inherent authority because this isnât intended to be a hornbook review of jurisdiction, but some first principles, mostly for non-lawyers working on blockchain projects who may be asking basic questions.
[4]. Hereâs a link to the District of Columbiaâs Long Arm Statute:  § 13-423. Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct.
This post originally appeared on LinkedIn and has been republished here with the authorâs permission.